Errata for John Buridan, Treatise on Consequences, Fordham UP 2014
pp.44-45: at p.45 line 13, note that Disamis and Bocardo LXX are also invalid, for the same reason. Consequently, in Table 6 on p.44, in row L and column X, replace 'X' by 'Darapti, Felapton, Datisi, Ferison X'
p.45 line 19: King denies two of Buridan's claims in the fifth (not sixth) conclusion of Book IV.
p.63 replace the first two sentences to read: In this book I wish to treat of consequences by revealing, as far as I can, their causes, of which many have been adequately demonstrated without explaining why [they hold] by others; but perhaps they have not been reduced to the first causes by which they are said to hold.[add footnote: For Aristotle's distinction between demonstration why something holds (propter quid, or a priori) and demonstration merely that it does (quia, or a posteriori), see Posterior Analytics I ch.13 and, e.g., Ockham's Summa Logicae III-2 ch.17.]
p.64 lines 7-9: for 'can be other than how it signifies they can be, or could be [other than how it signifies] they could be, or could have been' read 'cannot possibly be altogether as it signifies them possibly to be' and 'that things could not possibly be altogether as it signifies them possibly tohave been' or 'to have possibly been' (as proposed by Sten Ebbesen in his review)
p.65 line 9: Ebbesen also suggests replacing 'whichever of themi is' by 'such causes as would, each of them by itself, be', in order to show clearly that 'them' refers back to 'causes'. That is certainly what was intended, but if that is clearer, so be it, or perhaps just replace 'them is' by 'those causes is separately'.
p.73 line 15: for 'that which is B is A' read 'that which is B will be A'
p.82 line 11 up: for 'is necessarily not' read 'is not necessarily'
p.119 lines 5-6: a clearer translation might be: 'I will for the rest call "formal" those syllogisms to whose form one cannot give counterexamples.' [The sentence as printed has been unfortunately misunderstood by M.Toppel and E.Ramharter, 'Buridan's secular demarcation of logic,' Philosophia (2020), p.3, where they take Buridan to be defining a new notion of 'formal to the form', whereas in fact he is narrowly redefining the term 'formal' to permit the trinitarian counterexamples. One minimal correction to their paper would be to replace 'formal to the form' throughout their paper by 'formal in Buridan's sense'.]
p.130 bottom four lines: for 'there are some verbs that render the accusatives following them and that they govern such that the act described by those verbs does not straightforwardly apply to the things for which those accusatives supposit' read 'there are some verbs that apply to the accusatives following them and that they govern in such a way that the acts described by those verbs do not straightforwardly apply to the things for which those accusatives supposit'
If you notice any further problems, or have further suggestions for improvements, please let me know. Thanks.
Stephen Read
