Here are three of the major figures in the long British tradition of radically liberal political theory. They and others have left us a rich heritage: a philosophically articulated dream of a truly liberal society.
A society in which individuals are free to be the authors of their own lives. And therefore a society in which social and political power are to be justified to those individuals, on terms set by them. A society in which all have access to the necessities of material life, and also to all those resources necessary for a genuinely autonomous life - education, health care, security, and so on.
And all this spun out from one fundamental thought: that each person in society has a life to live, and must live it in that society. Here, for instance, is the most senior Leveller deducing the 'right of rights', the right to participate equally in choice of government, from that very consideration:-
"...for really I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest he; and therefore truly, Sir, I think it's clear, that every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government; and I do think that the poorest man in England is not bound in a strict sense to that government that he hath not had a voice to put himself under."
Colonel Thomas Rainsborough, in The Putney Debates, 1647.
If we are to live - indeed, to flourish - in civil society; if we are truly to be independent, autonomous agents within that society; then certain central and important matters must be ours to choose. For some areas of choice are so central to the very idea of an independent and autonomous agent that they can scarcely be separated from it.
You no doubt know the usual list. Choices over where we live, where we travel, our lifestyle, our religious observances, what government we favour, who we associate with, what opinions we voice, and so on.
And here is the homeland of the notion of a Right. Rights are there to protect choices, to reserve certain key areas of choice to the individuals involved.
Let's express this in the shape of a formal definition:
Which means, spelling out what we mean by 'protected':-DEF: Agent A has a right to Φ iff A's choices over Φ-ing are to be protected..
... if A chooses to Φ, then everyone has a duty not to interfere with A's exercise of his choice, and moreover, if B tries to interfere with A's exercising his choice, then B is to be prevented from doing so.
You might find it a useful exercise to run this past a few examples to get a sense of how it works. Here, for instance, is an application of the schema to the right to freedom of speech:-
If Alan chooses to give a racist speech in Birmingham, and members of the SWP try to stop him by - say - physically barring his entry to the appointed venue, then they are to be prevented from thus interfering with Alan's chosen course of action.
N.V.B.I. Alan's right here does not entitle him to any help in his project. It is not, for instance, incumbent upon anyone to find him a venue, an audience, a train ticket to Birmingham. The right requires us merely to protect his project from the interference of others.
I now draw your attention to three key features of Rights thus defined:-
Rights, Choice and Welfare | Rights and Reasons for Action | Rights and Duties
I preface them with a remark about the notation used in the definition above.
When philosophers use the Greek character Phi in this way, they are following the convention that 'Φ' is always schematic for a verb of action. So 'practise his own religion', or 'emigrate' or 'vote', etcetera, are appropriate fillings here for Φ, but noun-phrases like 'education' or 'basic health care', etcetera, would not be. Notice how silly it sounds if we drop in the wrong kind of filling:
Alan has a right to basic health care iff Alan's choices over basic health care are to be protected...
Which means, spelling out what we mean by 'protected',
..if Alan chooses to secure for himself basic health care by joining BUPA, and someone tries to stop him (e.g. by blocking Alan's approach to the postbox), then that person should be prevented from doing so.
Which is not at all what Aneurin Bevan thought he meant when he argued in the '40s that basic health care should be a right. He meant that the State should be providing basic health care for all its citizens. So you might think that here is a problem: our very definition of a right makes nonsense of our talk about the socio-economic rights (or welfare rights, or second-generation rights, call them what you will).
But now read on....
If the most fundamental notion of a Right is indeed connected to protecting choices, as claimed above, then how come we even talk of rights to education, employment, health, paid holidays, etcetera? How come we use the same locution in both cases?
The answer comes when you look at how political liberals argue for a thoroughgoing set of socio-economic rights. Here goes.
If one is really concerned about civil or political liberty for all, and committed to securing it for them, then than concern and commitment should extend to considering those material conditions of a person's life which make it possible for him to enjoy and exercise those civil liberties.
For otherwise the supposed concern looks remarkably shallow. What is the point of risking your life for the liberty of negroes to (say) eat in smart restaurants, if their economic deprivation means that such 'liberty' can have no impact on their lives? What is the point of defending someone's right to emigrate, if his economic position means that he can never exercise that right? Below, for instance, is David Hume poking John Locke in the eye over Locke's account of political obligation. You can read the whole essay ('Of The Original Contract' in Part II of the Essays Moral, Political and Literary) here.
"Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small wages he acquires?"
Again, it will be a useful exercise to think through a few cases on your own, to get a grasp of the general approach. Here, for instance, is an argument for a right to a basic education:
If a person is to live a free, autonomous life in our society, a life of choosing, then an ability to access the range of choices available is a prerequisite. So if we are serious about the importance of people having such lives available to them, we should be serious about providing education to the necessary level, and securing it as an entitlement. The necessary level here argued for will be (at least) what is requireed to understand how the world works, how this society works, to have an adequate grasp of wich choices are available to citizens, and so on. And this will not be just a rudimentary education: it will equip citizens to properly live a life. And that is going to be a lot of education .
What makes Rights special? How are Rights-considerations different from other ethical considerations? The answer is a consequence of our definition, and it is encapsulated in a well-known slogan:
Consider: Tom Baranga has been hauled before the Dean again! This time the alleged infraction is standing on his head in the middle of the lawn reciting the alphabet backwards. And you are a fly on the wall at the Decanal interview:
Z: "Give me one good reason for doing that."
G: "I have a perfect right to do it, according to college statute"
Notice how this isn't a reason for doing the deed - it doesn't tell us why Tom chose to exercise his rights in this eccentric manner. But now imagine a diferent conversation:
Z: "Give me one good reason why I shouldn't fine you for doing that."
G: "I have a perfect right to do it, according to college statute."
And notice how this time this is an appropriate answer. It does give the Dean a reason for action on the matter. And that's the point: Tom's rights here do not give him a reason for action. They give someone else (here, the appropriate college authority) a reason, by imposing a duty to protect choices made under the umbrella of that right.
Which leads gently into our last topic.....
This evil little goblin, although nominally the leader of a socialist party, is absolutely opposed to the liberal tradition in British political thought. His ideas are borrowed from the communitarian Right in the US, and one of his pet projects is to pervert the proper connection between rights and duties. For Blair, rights are not entitlements granted to all citizens, on the grounds (cited above) that they have a life to live. Rights are a commodity in Blair's thinking, and they have to be earned. And how earned? By being a decent citizen on the Blair model.
Well, he's right about one thing. Rights do generate duties. But not in the way Blair supposes. Look back at the definition. It imposes a duty on all to not interfere with A's chosen path, and it imposes on some a further duty to prevent anyone else interfering with A's choice.
Quite who those 'some' are will no doubt vary from case to case. Sometimes the duty will fall to the Police Force, or some other legitimate authority. Sometimes it will fall equally on all citizens. These are matters to be decided, case by case, and right by right. Our definition does not prescribe.
Now this connection is what philosophers mean when they talk abour rights being correlative to duties. They mean that to each right assigned to an individual A there correspond duties assigned to another party or parties, and also that for every duty assigned to an individual A, there will be rights - claim-rights that A fulfils his duty - assigned to some other(s).
Thus Tom has a right to eccentric behaviour on Balliol Lawn. This imposes a duty on Diego to not fine him. Or let us say that Tom promises not to be so eccentric in future. Then insofar as the promise imposes an obligation (or duty) to keep that promise upon Tom, it confers a right on Diego, a right to demand that Tom meet his obligation.
Notice how this correlation is intrinsic to the very notions of rights and duties. It is not, as in the Blair Project, a further connection just tacked on to the ideas, a connection requiring further political or theoretical commitments.
And now for a goodbye treat. Here's Harrison Ford in glorious Warholvision..
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Which means, spelling out what we mean by 'protected':-DEF: Agent A has a right to Φ iff A's choices over Φ-ing are to be protected..
... if A chooses to Φ, then everyone has a duty not to interfere with A's exercise of his choice, and moreover, if B tries to interfere with A's exercising his choice, then B is to be prevented from doing so.