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Workshop on Modality: With or Without Possible Worlds?
June 7
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The University of St Andrews Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology will be hosting a workshop on Modality, With or Without Possible Worlds?
DESCRIPTION: The purpose of the workshop is to bring together and promote research in the area of metaphysics of modality, with a specific focus on two broad themes: (i) the challenges associated with exclusively employing possible worlds to clarify our modal discourse about metaphysical necessity and possibility, among other metaphysical concepts; and (ii) alternative approaches that shed light on such discourse without relying on the concept of a possible world.
DATE AND VENUE: 7 June 2024, Online on Teams
SPEAKERS: Vera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern), Barbara Vetter (Freie Universität Berlin), Jennifer Wang (Simon Fraser University), Mark Jago (University of Nottingham), Takashi Tagisawa (California State University), and John Divers (Trinity College Dublin).
REGISTER HERE: https://forms.gle/Cnh4zpbyFXPzhg7v8
PROVISIONAL SCHEDULE (Note: All times are in British Summer Time):
Every time slot includes: the main talk (40 mins), and Q&A (20 mins).
9:55 – 10:00 Preliminary Remarks
10:00 – 11:00 Barbara Vetter (Freie Universität Berlin)
11:00 – 11:15 Break
11:15 – 12:15 Mark Jago (University of Nottingham)
12:15 – 12:30 Break
12:30 – 13:30 Jennifer Wang (Simon Fraser University)
13:30 – 14:30 Break
14:30 – 15:30 John Divers (Trinity College Dublin)
15:30 – 15:45 Break
15:45 – 16:45 Vera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern)
16:45 – 17:00 Break
17:00 – 18:00 Takashi Yagisawa (California State University)
TITLES AND ABSTRACTS:
Title: Modal epistemology without worlds: the case of axiom T (Barbara Vetter)
Abstract: Epistemologists of modality often assume that some knowledge of possibility is easy: knowledge by inference from actuality, via axiom T of modal logic. What is true in this world must be true at some world, after all; what could be easier? Inference by axiom T takes centre stage in similarity based modal epistemologies like that of Sonia Roca Royes, but it is generally assumed to be a form of easy modal knowledge. In this talk, I argue that the role of axiom T in a realistic modal epistemology has been overstated. The case of axiom T also serves as a case study for a general caveat not to project to much of our (modal) logic into a realistic (modal) epistemology.
Title: Knowing What it Is (Mark Jago)
Abstract: Essentialists understand modal properties in terms of the essences of things. Given this view, it is natural to think that our knowledge of modality ultimately derives from our knowledge of the essences of things. Is that view plausible? Do we genuinely have knowledge of the essences of things, in a form substantial enough to ground our modal knowledge? The more we pack into the notion of essence to allow it to underpin modal properties, the harder it is to claim genuine knowledge. I will argue that realists about essence of a certain kind can have the best of both worlds. They can co-opt a conventionalist explanation of our knowledge of essence, but against the background of a fully realist notion of essence.
Title: The Explanatory Grounds of De Re Modal Truths (Jennifer Wang)
Abstract: In Naming and Necessity, Kripke makes a forceful case for the actualist against the so-called “problem of transworld identification”. If the goal is to be able to use possible worlds semantics, then I think that his response is entirely correct. But if the goal is to provide an explanation of de re modal truths, then the actualist should reject transworld identity. In this paper, I argue that the actualist who wants to use possible worlds to explain facts such as “Oscar could have been a movie star” should adopt a purely qualitative conception of possible worlds. Perhaps more surprisingly, they should combine this with a counterpart-theoretic treatment of de re modality. I will argue that this combination is consistent with actualist motivations, and with Kripke’s views in particular.
Title: Modality, With or Without Possible Worlds? A Quinean Perspective (John Divers)
Abstract: We may proceed in the philosophy of modality with, or without, deploying the device of quantification over possible worlds. How we think of the advantages and disadvantages brought by the respective approaches will be determined for the most part on whether we are presupposing some form of modal realism. Here, I will address the matter from a modal anti-realist and – more specifically – Quinean perspective
Title: Counterpossibles, Causal Exclusion, and Impossible Worlds (Vera Hoffman-Kolss)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that counterpossible conditionals, whose truth conditions are formulated in terms of impossible worlds, can shed new light on the problem of causal exclusion. According to the interventionist version of this problem, higher-level (e.g., mental) properties described by an interventionist causal model are causally pre-empted by the lower-level properties upon which they supervene, because it is metaphysically impossible to intervene on the higher-level properties without changing at least some of the lower-level properties (which then do all the causal work). Recent debate has shown, however, that there are several reasons to allow for counterpossible interventions as well. But once counterpossible interventions are allowed in certain metaphysical contexts, there is no good reason to ban them from causal exclusion contexts. I argue that this paves the way for a new approach to the causal exclusion problem. The autonomy of higher-level properties can be vindicated by showing that higher-level properties and lower-level properties enter into different counterpossible dependence relations. These counterpossible dependence relations can in turn be interpreted in terms of impossible worlds.
Title: Ontology of Some Philosophy (Takashi Yagisawa)
Abstract: When philosophers discuss philosophical views, theories, or arguments, their discussion is often not metaphysically innocent. Given certain substantial but widely accepted assumptions concerning relativization of truth, the worlds framework, and understanding ontological issues in terms of domains of discourse (see Three Insights below), it can be argued that the extent of ontological involvement of some philosophical discussion is considerable. In particular, philosophical discussion concerning modal metaphysics frequently makes the discussants incur non-trivial ontological commitments.
Three Insights:
(1 )It is useful to relativize the notion of truth for many philosophical purposes; a sentence is true or false at a truth-relativizer.
(2) The framework of worlds, including both possible worlds and impossible worlds, gives us truth-relativizers for the purposes of explicating the truth conditions of many important kinds of sentences, in particular, counterfactual conditional sentences.
(3) Ontological matters should be understood as matters pertaining to the domain of discourse associated with quantification.
Supposition-Based Argument: “You assert P. Suppose you are right and P is true. Then Q follows. But Q is false. So, P is false and you are not right”.
Claim: Three insights + Supposition-Based Argument ⇨ a potentially endless sequence of ever-expanding ontological commitments.