Title: Avoid Inconsistency? Two Accounts of Incompatibility

Abstract: Many take inconsistent states to be not only self-incompatible, but also to be incompatible with every other state, whether consistent or inconsistent. On one way of construing such approaches, two states are incompatible if and only if their fusion is inconsistent (i.e., a contradiction can be derived from the resulting state). Having as a background work that has been developed on negation as expressing incompatibility or ruling out, for instance by Michael Dunn (1993, 1996), Greg Restall (2000) and Franz Berto (2015) (and the latter two together in Berto and Restall (2019)), as well as work on subtle and blatant inconsistencies by Jago (2014) and Berto and Jago (2019), I will explore the prospects of an account of incompatibility according to which two states are incompatible if and only if a contradiction is more easily derivable from the fusion than from any of the parts of the fused states.