Title: Can a Russellian Monist Be a Genuine Physicalist?

Abstract:

Currently, Russellian Monism is a cutting-edge theory in the discussion of phenomenal consciousness. It has the potential to retain the advantages of both narrow physicalism and narrow dualism by locating phenomenal consciousness in a fundamentally unified universe, having it play essential causal roles in the physical aspect, and at the same time respecting its specific features.   Many see Russellian Monism as an opportunity to construct a new version of physicalism, Russellian physicalism, which has more advantages than narrow physicalism because it can avoid the difficulties faced by narrow physicalism, especially those posed by the knowledge argument (Jackson, 1982; 1986), the explanatory gap argument (Levine, 1983; 2006), and the conceivability argument (Chalmers, 2009). But the issue here is more complex. Some argue that a genuine or full-blooded physicalist must deny that there is anything specific to phenomenal consciousness at the fundamental level of the universe. Russellian Monism takes intrinsic natures (or quiddities) underlying structures and relations at the fundamental level in the universe as the keys to explaining the generation of high-level phenomenal consciousness, which is itself the high-level intrinsic nature of high-level structural systems such as human brains. However, it is argued that Russellian fundamental quiddities must be specific to consciousness, and thus, Russellian physicalism is itself an inconsistent theory. This is bad news for physicalists in general.

In this paper, I will argue that it is compatible for a Russellian Monist to be a genuine physicalist or that the concept of “Russellian physicalism” is consistent. There have been some illuminating arguments for the compatibility on this issue, but I will argue that they, in some sense, miss the core point of the challenge of incompatibility or inconsistency to Russellian physicalism. After setting out this core point, I will offer my own responses.